Cambodia at a Cross-Roads:
How Repealing UNTAC Article 63,
Cambodia’s Criminal Defamation Law,
Will Lead to a More Vigorous Democracy

Alicia Adornato
February 7, 2006

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………3
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..3
Background………………………………………………………………….…………..6
Cambodian History……………………………………………………….…………..6
The Current Situation………………………………………………………………...14
The Judiciary…………………………………………………………………………15
Freedom of Expression…………………………………………………………….....17
Defamation…………………………………………………………………………...19
Cambodia’s Constitution……………………………………………………...……...20
Sources of International Law………………………………………………………....21
Treaties……………………………………………………………………………......22
International Practice………………………………………………………………...23
Legal Problem……………………………………………………………………………25
Analysis…………………………………………………………………………………..25
Proposal…………………………………………………………………………………..30
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………..31

2

ABSTRACT
Cambodia’s current criminal defamation law is an impermissible intrusion of
Cambodians’ constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expression. The law itself is a
remnant of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. Moreover it is now being
used as a tool to silence the government’s political opposition through a weak judiciary system,
leaving in its wake a democracy afraid to exercise its constitutionally guaranteed rights. This
law is an unconstitutional violation for several reasons: first, it violates the right to freedom of
expression which is guaranteed in Cambodia’s Constitution. Secondly, it is incompatible with
Cambodia’s human rights obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Furthermore, it violates customary international law. This comment proposes that the
Cambodian Parliament pass new a new civil defamation law which denies legal standing to the
government. Legal standing should be denied to the government to safeguard against the
potential abuse of any civil defamation law.
INTRODUCTION
A blanket is spread underneath a large Banyan tree. An older man sits in the middle of a
crowd, a typical Khmer scarf wrapped around his neck. The crowd is gathered around him,
listening anxiously to the words coming from his mouth. He speaks quickly, in an almost
agitated manner, as he does when he speaks about political issues in his country. He is
explaining to his audience the benefits of a multi-party democratic system, the advantages of a
free market of political thought. The audience listens raptly. They are villagers and farmers,
some traveling great distances to hear Kem Sokha speak. This man is becoming known in the
countryside for these open discussions.
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This scene is repeated throughout the countryside in Cambodia. Kem Sokha hosts these
functions, which he describes as public forums, approximately once a week. One specific
afternoon, an audience asks him about his recent arrest and detention. He has been charged with
criminal defamation. The charges stem from the words on a banner which hung above a booth
sponsored by his organization, the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR), at an
International Human Rights Day event. One farmer talks about his desire to exercise his
freedom of speech, another woman expresses her fear of political repercussions. Few are willing
to give their names. This latest scene, as described in a recent New York Times article,1 is
characteristic of CCHR’s public forums. Kem Sokha, president and founder of CCHR, is one of
the most outspoken critics of the government in Cambodia. Evidence of this is the prime
minister’s recent threat against those attending public forums, where he claimed he did not know
what would happen to the people who chose to attend.2
Kem Sokha was charged with criminal defamation on two separate occasions in 2005.
The first time, in March of 2005, Prince Norodom Ranarridh filed charges on the grounds that
Kem Sokha defamed him on a radio program by making allegations that he was bribed to join
the prime minister Hun Sen’s party. The charges were not pursued following a statement by
Kem Sokha in open court which emphasized the need for public opinion and the constitutional
provisions which support freedom of expression.3 Kem Sokha was arrested on December 31,
2005, on further criminal defamation charges. This time, the charges involved the alleged
defamation of the prime minister. Kem Sokha was held in prison for almost three weeks.
During that time, international criticism was mounting against the prime minister for his role in
the arrest. The international community called for his release. The prime minister released Kem
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Sokha on bail after those three weeks but the charges still stand as the prime minister claims he
cannot stop the judicial machinery now that it has instituted charges.
Kem Sokha risks his freedom and his life in raising questions about Cambodia’s
democratic processes. These two sets of defamation charges illustrate the current regime’s fear
because raising these questions threatens the current regime, making Kem Sokha a target. He is
never without one of his ten bodyguards, a constant reminder of the danger of his work in a
country where political assassinations still occur. Cambodia is currently at a crossroads because
its future is so uncertain. If Cambodia comes out of this era as an emerging democracy, it will be
because of the courage of Cambodians like Kem Sokha or Dr. Kek Galabru, head of the human
rights organization LICADHO, who choose to fight the status quo. Freedom of expression is a
vital human right, nowhere is it more obvious than here. Repressive acts that are made public,
like the recent arrest of Kem Sokha, produce a chilling effect of an unknown magnitude. When
people see the consequences of voicing any kind of an opinion contrary to the government, they
will not dare do so themselves. As one older woman recently commented at a public forum,
“You talk about democracy, but how much of a right do the people of Cambodia have to speak
out? If we speak out, will we be arrested like Kem Sokha?”4 The chilling effects are much more
pervasive in a country like Cambodia where the current generation remembers the terrors and
repression when Angkar, a term which refers to the Khmer Rouge government, ruled.5
Criminal defamation laws greatly impede the goals of a vigorous democracy as a
democracy is dependent upon an engaged and educated populace. There is a pressing need for a
civil defamation law in Cambodia that adequately protects Cambodians’ rights of free expression
while still respecting the rights of an individual to his or her reputation. This comment proposes
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that the proper way to strike a balance between these two competing interests is to abolish the
criminal penalties for defamation and deny standing to the government in civil defamation suits.
This comment analyzes a current Cambodian law, UNTAC Article 63. This law provides
for criminal punishment if the defendant is convicted of defaming another Cambodian. A
transitional body, not by the Cambodian government, wrote the law and it should be repealed as
it is an unconstitutional violation of Article 41 of the Cambodian Constitution. Additionally,
UNTAC Article 63 violates Cambodia’s treaty obligations under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Furthermore, criminal defamation laws are inconsistent with
customary international law. Multi-lateral treaties and customary international law are indicative
of a country’s obligations to its citizens in protecting their rights. UNTAC Article 63 is
inconsistent with these two guides.
BACKGROUND
Cambodian History
In order to fully understand the context of this comment, it is crucial to be familiar with a
small portion of Cambodia’s history to be able to analyze the severe implications of a law
criminalizing defamatory statements in such a fragile democracy. With the legacy of the oncemighty Khmer Empire that ruled the entire region, Cambodia has recently been plagued by death
and the destruction of its country.
The Khmer Empire once extended over present-day Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand,
Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.6 Angkor Wat, the most grandiose of the temples at Angkor, was
built by Suryavarman II who ruled in the early twelfth century.7 Today Angkor is regarded as
one of the modern day mysteries of the world. Its majestic presence serves as a reminder of the
prominence of the Khmer Empire and the greatness of the Khmer people. Cambodians still refer
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to themselves as the Khmer people, in reference to this magnificent history that remains a source
of Khmer pride today. French colonization came to Indochina in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. After France colonized present-day southern Vietnam, Cambodia became a French
protectorate in 1864.8
In 1941, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, then eighteen years old, was installed by the French
as King of Cambodia. After the Japanese occupation during World War II, public resentment of
the French presence grew because Cambodians, 9 like those in many other colonized countries in
Southeast Asia, no longer saw the French as a superior form of government since they were
unable to prevent the Japanese from occupying the country.10 Sihanouk successfully persuaded
France to grant Cambodia independence in 1953. People began to think of Sihanouk as the
“Father of Cambodian Independence.”11 This period, during Sihanouk’s reign, represents the
only relative tranquility the current generation of Cambodians have experienced.12
Cambodia’s political instability began initially with Lon Nol’s bloodless coup d’etat in
1970 which wrested power from Prince Sihanouk.13 Lon Nol, as one American military adviser
related, was a “nuts and bolts” man,14 more concerned with the daily operations of his military
than the country’s future. As Lon Nol stated, he did not bother himself with keeping track of the
financial affairs of state.15 These are interesting words for the prime minister of a country at
war, a country dependent upon foreign American military aid for its survival.
Lon Nol was backed by the United States because the U.S. wanted a friendly government
in power in Cambodia. The United States was then entrenched in its war in neighboring
Vietnam against the North Vietnamese. A Cambodian government that was understanding of
U.S. interests in the region was extremely important to the American administration. Adding to
U.S. concern, King Sihanouk had previously been supporting the North Vietnamese during the

7

Vietnam War while claiming to be neutral. Sihanouk believed that his country’s survival
depended upon this purported neutrality and covert support for the North Vietnamese because he
believed they would eventually beat the softer Americans.16 Prince Sihanouk had been allowing
weapons to be imported from China to the coast, to Sihanoukville, and transported over the
Cambodian border in return for arms for his own military.17 Additionally, Vietcong had been
hiding in Cambodian enclaves, just over the southern Cambodian-Vietnamese border. As a
result, the United States government began bombing the Cambodian border in 1969.18
The country was soon immersed in a civil war between Lon Nol’s U.S. backed
government and the Khmer Rouge, who were seeking to convert Cambodia into a Communist
state. The movement was led by French educated Cambodians who viewed Communism as a
self-sufficient solution for Cambodia.19 Many Cambodians did not know much about the Khmer
Rouge but supported this new government in the hopes that it would bring peace.20 The
American bombings of civilian targets along the Cambodian border created a deep mistrust of
anything American,21 and as a result many villagers supported the Khmer Rouge.
The war culminated on April 17, 1975 when Khmer Rouge forces entered the capital,
Phnom Penh, and Lol Non fled to the United States.22 The new Communist government soon
implemented its plan to agriculturize the country at a rapid speed. Young soldiers marched the
people from the cities to the countryside where they then forced them
to work in the fields
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perform other agricultural tasks.23 Pol Pot declared that the “insidious ‘bourgeois’ ideas,
preferences, and attitudes … that had to be destroyed before socialism could be achieved.”24
Many city dwellers, mostly the educated upper-class, were killed because they were viewed by
the Khmer Rouge as “internal class enemies,”25 contaminated by the West. 1.7 million
Cambodians were murdered during the Khmer Rouge period, the killing fields are a testament to
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this murderous legacy.26 Their bodies were piled on top of one another in enormous mass
graves, stacks of sun bleached skulls became the world’s image of Cambodia. Before long, Pol
Pot’s brutal regime began to turn inward as the revolution was not creating the immediate results
Pol Pot expected.27 Loyal party members were soon questioned and tortured at the infamous
prison, Tuol Sleng also known as S-21.28
During the Khmer Rouge period, Cambodia was also embroiled in a border struggle with
Vietnam. The border has long been a point of contention between the two countries. In late
1977, the Vietnamese attacked a few settlements along the frontier to spur border negotiations
with the Khmer Rouge government. However, “it was as if they had poked a beehive with a
stick,”29 and Cambodia’s leaders “began preparing for a holy war.”30 These actions led to the
Vietnamese invasion in 1979.
With the arrival of the Vietnamese, Pol Pot and loyal members of his Khmer Rouge
government fled into the mountains on the Cambodian-Thai border.31 Pol Pot stayed in the
mountains until his death in 1998 and factions of the Khmer Rouge still remain there.32
Cambodia was soon christened the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), a satellite of the
Vietnamese government in Hanoi.33 One of the emerging political powers during this time
period was Hun Sen, who is now the current prime minister of Cambodia.34 He initially began as
a zone commander in the Khmer Rouge, but later defected to Vietnam when the internal purges
began.35 Vietnam continued to exercise control over Cambodia until its forces withdrew in 1989
because of its own lack of funding after the fall of the Soviet Union.36
The Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict37
(“The Paris Agreements”) laid the framework for a new democratic Cambodia. Many states
participated in the Agreements, 38 a non-exhaustive list includes Australia, China, France,
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Singapore, Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United
States and Vietnam.39 It was an era of immense hope as the United Nations came to Cambodia
to help launch this new democratic government.
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) faced a difficult
challenge: to democratize a country after almost thirty years of civil war coupled with foreign
rule. UNTAC was ultimately ineffective in demilitarizing the country, many Khmer Rouge
soldiers continued to control parts of the country.40 UNTAC decided to focus its energy on
organizing a free election for the country rather than demilitarizing the country as it saw
demilitarization as an impossible task.41 UNTAC backed off its broad democratization mandate
in favor of free elections. However it is clear that elections are only one indicia of a political
democracy, as one author succinctly described the three basic requirements for a democracy to
truly exist:
A democracy must meet three basic procedural criteria: (1) Competitive
elections must be the route to forming governments. There must be competitive
popular elections for the legislature … Fraud and coercion may not determine
the outcome of democratic elections. Elections must offer the possibility of
alternation in power… (2) There must be broad adult citizenship … this has
meant nearly universal citizenship … (3) Democracies must protect minority
rights and must ensure respect for basic civil liberties: freedom of the press,
freedom of speech, the right to habeas corpus, etc. This dimension is important
because a regime can hold competitive elections with broad participation, yet in
the absence of guarantees of civil liberties, it is not fully democratic.42
Cambodia still struggles today to have competitive elections. The second requirement of
universal citizenship is largely satisfied in Cambodia as citizenship derives from birth, descent
from a Cambodian parent, naturalization or marriage to a Cambodian citizen.43 However
considerable change must be effectuated to enforce the basic civil liberties accorded to
Cambodians. The director of Human Rights Watch in Southeast Asia, a prominent human rights
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organization that monitors the situation in Cambodia, recently stated that he believes Hun Sen is
effectively running Cambodia as an authoritarian government.44
In addition to the contested elections, another legacy of the UNTAC era is the body of
law it instituted. UNTAC faced a difficult task, one it was not prepared for. It needed to create a
new body of law during the transitional period as the decade-old PRK law was insufficient.
Criminal law during the PRK period consisted of Law-Decree #2, “Crimes Against the
Revolution,” which was a list of prohibited acts.45 UNTAC was unprepared to create a new body
of laws in Cambodia in order to implement its human rights mandate.46 This remains an ongoing problem with UN peacekeeping missions. One suggestion entails the creation of off-theshelf “justice packages” by the United Nations with pre-written laws reflecting the UN’s human
rights mandates. Once established, these packages would be ready for application and could then
be tweaked as necessary according to each country.47 UN peacekeeping missions have
implemented laws like Article 63 that do not conform to the treaties advanced by the United
Nations. The UNTAC process was “time consuming and resulted in an incomplete set of
laws.”48 Article 63, most likely drawn from Cambodia’s pre-UNTAC law that was based on
Vietnamese counterrevolutionary crimes,49 is inconsistent with the ICCPR because it protects the
rights of freedom of expression.50
Article 63 of the UNTAC code lays out Cambodia’s criminal defamation law.
Cambodia’s basic requirements include a bad faith allegation or imputation of a given fact which
harms the honor or reputation of an individual. The person need not be explicitly named but his
identity must be made evident from the defamatory action. Article 63 mandates punishment by
imprisonment of eight days to one year, a fine of one million to ten million riels (approximately
U.S. $250 to U.S. $2,500) or both.51 An individual may register a complaint with the appropriate
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prosecutor and petition the court to file a criminal defamation charge against the defendant. This
may be done in addition to, not in lieu of, any civil action the individual brings against the
defendant, further punishing the alleged defamer.
In the 1993 elections, newly organized parties clambered onto the scene to take part in
the historic elections. Parties included the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), the
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre,
Pacifique et Coopératif52 (FUNCINPEC), which translates from French as The National United
Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia, the Buddhist Liberal
Democratic Party (BLDP) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).53 From this initial group,
the CPP and FUNCINPEC represent two of the three main political parties today. Many
candidates from the CPP were former Khmer Rouge soldiers and/or officials in the Vietnamesebacked government of the 1980s. FUNCINPEC represented the royalists. The period before the
elections was marred by violence and intimidation, with CPP perpetrating the majority of the
violence.54 Ultimately, a testament to the freedom of these elections, FUNCINPEC won the
elections, taking 45.2 percent of the vote while the CPP received 38.6 percent, BLDP 3.7
percent, the LDP 1.3 percent and the Molinka 1.3 percent.
What transpired next explains much of the current state of Cambodia: the CPP refused to
accept the results of the election, and the king, a powerful political figure whom Cambodians
respect, did not press the issue. As a result, power was shared between FUNCINPEC and the
CPP with two prime ministers in what was intended to be a post for one, the winner of the
election.55 There was a feeling of utter hopelessness that passed over the country, a feeling that
nothing was going to change.56 At that point, many Cambodians disengaged from the political
process because the CPP retained power even though they had lost the election. The democratic
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process did not achieve what UNTAC had advertised: free elections. This failure left a
devastating legacy on the country. A democracy is dependent upon an engaged and educated
populace. If one’s vote in U.N. monitored elections affects no change, then one must question
whether subsequent elections make a difference. The United Nations’ peacekeeping mission
ultimately had little impact upon the political landscape within Cambodia since the CPP, a party
of ex-Khmer Rouge cadres and Vietnamese officials, is still the dominant power in Cambodian
politics. It has won the past series of elections by sowing fear in the local people.57 One
particular fear the CPP plays upon is a fear of returning to a state of civil war by threatening
violence if they do not win an election. This fear of a civil war lead King Sihanouk to allow the
CPP to share the prime minister position.58 Following the 1993 elections, the 1998 elections and
the 2003 elections suffered from similar problems of intimidation.
In a move to consolidate his power, Hun Sen orchestrated a coup d’etat in 1997 against
his co-prime minister through “a systematic campaign of intimidation, torture and summary
executions.”59 The same year, a grenade was thrown into a peaceful demonstration in downtown
Phnom Penh organized by the SRP— the main opposition party. At least sixteen people died
and 150 more were injured. Evidence linked Hun Sen’s bodyguards with the attack.60 This
willingness to resort to violence promised Hun Sen’s success in the 1998 elections.
The 2003 elections, however, were not a landslide for the CPP as the 1998 elections had
been. These elections painted similar troubling themes of impunity, intimidation, gift
distribution and vote-buying.61 The CPP received 47.4 percent of the vote, FUNCINPEC about
20 percent and the SRP about 20 percent.62 The SRP is a newer political party that encompasses
most of the opposition to the CPP. The Cambodian Constitution requires a two-thirds
parliamentary majority. This was not possible without an alliance between two of the three
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parties. The SRP initially formed an alliance with FUNCINPEC, which they called the Alliance
of Democrats (AD).63 The parties’ agreement included broad democratic mandates as well as
mandated the ouster of Hun Sen. At the last minute, FUNCINPEC dropped SRP and aligned
with the CPP. It was a move that made many suspicious. Rumors flew that Prince Ranarridh,
who had made the decision without informing his royalist party, had been, among other things,
bribed with a helicopter by the prime minister.64 As a result of this political wrangling, the
Cambodian government came to a standstill for almost a year.
The Current Situation
The events following the 1993 elections underscore the fragile state of Cambodian
democracy today. It is within this environment of political repression that timorous Cambodians
take their first steps towards asserting their constitutionally guaranteed rights.65 It is crucial that
the current UNTAC criminal defamation law be abolished in light of Cambodia’s purported
dedication to the goals of democracy as seen in its Constitution. The Cambodian Constitution is
a beautifully written document but it remains just that, a document, rather than truly reflects the
contours of the government and the limits upon its power. The current government, with Hun
Sen as prime minister, uses the cloth of the Constitution to legitimize its actions to the outside
world while daily life in Cambodia remains stagnant.
The murder of Chea Vichea, a prominent labor activist and president of the Free Trade
Union of Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia (FTUWKC), in 2004 is indicative of the current
era of fear as this may have been the work of the government to silence its opposition.66
Although many decried the situation, this frightening tactic ultimately proved effective as
membership in the union plummeted.67 Following the public outcry over the murder of Chea
Vichea, the government has refined its tools of oppression. It now utilizes its weak judiciary to
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convict opposition members on trumped up charges, with criminal defamation charges among
the most common.68 Commentators believe that Cambodia’s courts are being used to suppress
political opposition.69
The Judiciary
Cambodia’s judiciary, as the final arbiter of any UNTAC Article 63 charges, seemingly
sits in a unique place to judge the merit of claims brought by the government. This is not the
case in Cambodia though because the judiciary has not attained any independence from the
executive branch of the government and remains a highly political office.70 Judges follow party
directives in making decisions rather than coming to a decision based upon their own legal
training,71 education is minimal as is training. Corruption is rampant.72 The Asian Development
bank, in an October 2000 report, stated that “the Cambodian judiciary does not yet meet
acceptable standards in terms of independence, capability, and integrity.”73 There is little to
indicate that anything has changed since this report in 2000. Most Cambodians view the
judiciary as an extension of the CPP.
Cambodians see little use for the judiciary in their daily lives. If a problem arises in the
village, the aggrieved will approach the village chief or the local party representative asking
them to resolve the problem rather than turning to the courts.74 The King, the National Assembly
and the Prime Minister are frequently petitioned by the rich and poor alike to intervene on behalf
of the supplicant.75 Again, the history of Cambodia teaches a valuable lesson— Cambodia has
traditionally been a village-based society where the village chief resolves disputes. During
Sihanouk’s reign, a legal system based upon the French system was emerging but any hope at a
transition from this feudal structure to a legal system was suspended when the Khmer Rouge
took power. Lawyers were one of the main targets of the search for “internal class enemies.”
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After the Khmer Rouge period, there were ten legally trained people remaining in the country.76
This utter destruction of the previous legal system created staggering challenges for the
introduction of a competent, independent judiciary today.
The Ministry of Justice has been a hot political issue since the 1993 elections. CPP
officials insisted upon control of the judiciary for fear that there would be an investigation of the
pre-election murders.77 This control exerted by the Minister of Justice, who historically has had
a close relationship with the prime minister, over the judiciary has seriously hampered any
reform efforts. Most judges have a high school education at best. Party control over the
judiciary is a reality in Cambodia and “until the judiciary is released from party control, reform
will be impossible.”78 Judges know that they must follow party directives in their rulings or risk
the consequences of doing so.79
The judicial experience underscores a greater issue in Cambodia: ignorance. The Khmer
Rouge government valued ignorance, in fact it enabled survival because anyone with an
education was a target.80 This history leaves substantial obstacles in teaching the power of
education and knowledge. Kem Sokha’s public forums in the provinces are designed to educate
rural Cambodians of their rights in this new democracy.
The issues with the judiciary run deep. The lack of independence of the judiciary from
the executive is troubling. It is especially ominous when the executive is the plaintiff charging
an individual with criminal defamation. When the government wields this control over the
judiciary, the judiciary cannot be impartial as it must be. In order to prevent this bias, the
government must be denied the legal standing to bring any defamation suit, criminal or civil.
The law must be structured to prevent this potential abuse of power. The government, a
transitory body, does not have the same interest in reputation as an individual does.
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Freedom of Expression
Three theories behind free speech illuminate its importance: (1) John Stuart Mill’s theory
that truth can only be judged in light of a competitive market;81 (2) the theory that free speech is
an integral aspect of self-fulfillment and self-expression that otherwise inhibits the growth of an
individual;82 and (3) the theory that free speech is essential for citizen participation in a
democracy.83 All three of these theories emphasize the power of free speech as well as illustrate
why freedom of expression is considered a basic human right.
In analyzing the theory that free expression is critical in a democracy, freedom of
political expression is vital because a democracy depends up on an educated electorate.84 In
order to cast an educated vote, the people must be aware of what their government is doing. This
is one of the reasons why transparency within a government is so important. Vigorous public
debate is an integral aspect to an educated populace. Criminal defamation laws have a profound
chilling effect on public discourse because people fear the repercussions of expressing their
opinion. All truths are not exposed.
The basic premise within a democratic society is that freedom of expression may only be
restricted when it is necessary for the state to protect an individual’s reputation.85 Greater
freedom of expression must be granted when that expression involves statements about public
officials or the government. Significant weight must be afforded to the state interest in public
discourse because it is vital to a functioning democracy.86 Likewise, the state does have an
interest in protecting the rights of the individual. Any restrictions on freedom of expression can
only be justified if it can be convincingly established that it is absolutely necessary in a
democratic society. A restriction cannot be justified if there is a less restrictive means for
protecting the legitimate reputation interest. Nor can it be justified if disproportionate damage is
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done to the freedom of expression in protecting the individual’s reputation.87 Similarly, criminal
defamation laws disproportionately damage free speech because the punishment is so extreme.
Penal detention is an inappropriate remedy because the benefits of protecting this state interest
cannot outweigh the harm to freedom of expression. It is even more pressing in a country like
Cambodia where the government is abusing the criminal defamation laws. The critical balancing
test between these competing state interests, the interest in free expression and the interest in
protecting an individual’s reputation, is not being respected. As a result, this criminal
defamation law violates the freedom of Cambodian citizens to express their opinions.
Defamation law is often used as a tool to silence opposition critics by political bodies and
public figures.88 It is imperative for courts to monitor the use of defamation laws to ensure that
they do not improperly restrict the freedom of expression because defamation laws cannot be
justified when their purpose is to prevent the legitimate criticism of public officials89. A 2003
report on the state of Cambodia’s political system noted, “[w]hile political parties are allowed to
function in Cambodia, nevertheless, they are subject to systematic harassment and
intimidation.”90 This harassment and intimidation is pursued in the government’s abuse of
criminal defamation charges.
It appears that this is currently happening in Cambodia. This past year alone, many high
profile critics of the government were charged with criminal defamation. In October, radio
journalist Mom Sonando was arrested on charges of criminal defamation and incitement, as was
the president of the Cambodian Independent Teachers Association, Rong Chhum.91 In
December, Sam Rainsy, leader of the Sam Rainsy Party, was convicted, in absentia, of criminal
defamation.92 Another SRP parliamentarian, Chea Poch, fled the country with Sam Rainsy after
their parliamentary immunity was stripped. Chea Poch has been charged with criminal
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defamation for allegedly accusing the leader of the FUNCINPEC party, Prince Ranarridh, of
joining the 2003 coalition government with the CPP in exchange for U.S. $30 million from the
prime minister Hun Sen.93 Hang Sakhorn, editor of a Cambodian newspaper, the Ponleu
Sarnaki, was arrested in Kompong Speu on December 2, 2005 on charges of criminal
defamation.94 On December 31, 2005, Kem Sokha, “one of the country’s most prominent and
outspoken human rights figures”95 and president of CCHR, was arrested on charges of criminal
defamation. The very same day Yeng Virak, director of the Community Education Legal Center
(CELC) was arrested on the same charges. Five days later, on January 4, 2006, Pa Nguon Teang,
director of CCHR’s radio program Voice of Democracy, was also arrested on the same charges.96
This long list is only a sample of the arrests that have taken place and only includes prominent
persons. If these well-known citizens can be arrested and held, even with the world’s
condemnation, an ordinary citizen without any connections must undoubtedly be afraid to
publicly voice his opinion for fear of reprisal. The government is using Article 63, the criminal
defamation law, to pursue its own political agenda rather than protect the reputational rights of
its citizens which is an abuse of the law.
Defamation
Defamation is a public statement that injures the reputation of another.97 The prima facie
requirements vary depending upon the country’s individual law but all involve the publication or
dissemination of the defamatory statement to a third party either negligently or intentionally.98
Additionally, the statement must pertain to this particular individual and it must be a statement
that a reasonable person would find defamatory.99
Cambodia’s defamation law mandates a criminal punishment which is satisfied by jail
time, a fine or both.100 To be found guilty of criminal defamation, there must be a bad faith
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allegation of a fact which harms the honor or reputation of an individual where the individual’s
identity need not be explicitly stated but can be discerned from the situation.101 Article 63
additionally defines defamation as any allegation or imputation against a public figure that the
alleged defamer knows to be false and distributes with a malicious intent.102
The legality of the UNTAC provision will be analyzed from several perspectives: the
Cambodian Constitution, the treaties Cambodia has signed, as well as customary international
law. When analyzing the legality of a domestic law, one should first analyze the provision under
the country’s constitution and then under international standards. Cambodia’s Constitution
guarantees freedom of expression— so long as it does not violate the rights of others.103 Article
63 is also in violation of international standards because it (1) violates international treaties and
(2) violates international custom because many countries are decriminalizing their defamation
laws.104 International courts have found that criminal defamation laws violate freedom of
expression because they mandate a punishment disproportionate to the crime.105 Additionally,
criminal defamation laws are not a proper remedy because it is the damage done to the
individual’s reputation that must be repaired. The focus should be on the victim’s restitution.106
Cambodia’s Constitution
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia was adopted September 21, 1993 by the
Constitutional Assembly in Phnom Penh. It establishes the structure of the government and
guarantees specific human rights to its citizens. The preamble proclaims that its goal is to
“restore Cambodia into an ‘Island of Peace’ based on a multi-party liberal democratic regime
guaranteeing human rights.”107 Similarly, Article 31 of the Cambodian Constitution recognizes
and respects the human rights of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as well as the covenants and conventions related to human rights.
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The Cambodian Constitution recognizes in Article 41 the rights of Khmer citizens to the
freedom of expression. However “no one shall exercise this right to infringe upon the rights of
others, to effect the good traditions of society or violate public law and order and national
security.”108 Cambodia’s Constitution does not grant itscitizens an unqualified right to freedom
of speech like the United States Constitution does. Cambodia’s Constitution qualifies this right
like many other countries’ constitutions that do not have such an unqualified right.109 Case law
demonstrates the balancing act between the need for freedom of expression and the rights of the
individual for recourse when defamation occurs.110 It is essential that this balance be applied
appropriately. The law cannot be abused by the government as a method for eradicating Khmer
citizens’ rights to freedom of expression. Furthermore, Article 150 of the Cambodian
Constitution stipulates that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and that all laws must
be in strict conformity with the Constitution. Cambodia’s Constitution requires that all Khmer
laws, in order to conform to the Constitution, respect the rights of freedom of expression under
Article 41 by balancing that right with the rights of other citizens, namely the rights of citizens to
protect their reputations from defamatory statements.
Sources of International Law
International law is an important guide in analyzing whether a domestic law violates the
human rights of the country’s citizens because it represents international standards. These
standards are reflected in multi-lateral treaties, customary international law, general principles of
law as well as decisions by international judicial bodies and academic work.
Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) defines sources of international
law.111 First, the court is to apply international conventions, recognized by the contesting states;
second, the court is to apply international custom, evidenced by the a general practice being
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accepted as law; third, the court is to look at general principles of law recognized by civil
nations, and, lastly, the court is to turn to previous judicial decisions and scholarly works as
subsidiary means for determining the law.112 These sources of law are reflective for international
scholars evaluating the legality of national laws.
Treaties
Defamation law chills free speech as it discourages public statements against another
individual.113 Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mandates
that, “Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference and the right to
freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers.”114 This right, however, is subject to certain
restrictions, but only those that are required to “respect the rights and reputations of others”115
and “for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.”116
The ICCPR’s limitations are reflected in legal systems worldwide—specifically, in civil
defamation laws, where malicious untrue statements are not tolerated but public discourse is
promoted.
Problems of enforceability arise with human rights treaties because states have little
incentive to abide by treaties they ratify. The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR117 (“First Optional
Protocol”) creates an enforcement mechanism by allowing individuals to bring claims against
their own government to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) in Geneva.
Any claims brought to the UNHRC must arise out of the state’s violation of rights guaranteed by
the ICCPR. Thus, within the context of Cambodia’s criminal defamation laws, an individual
could bring a claim against the state of Cambodia if the state were violating his or her right to
freedom of expression which is preserved by Article 19 of the ICCPR.
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International Practice
International practice is an important barometer of customary international law. It
demonstrates the norms as well as different approaches depending on the structure of a state’s
constitution with the differing rights constitutions guarantee.
The United States Constitution provides an unabridged right to the freedom of speech in
its First Amendment. In New York Times v. Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court held that
in order to protect constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, an individual cannot sue for
defamation for statements made about his public duties in a public role unless the statement was
made with actual malice.118 The Court defined actual malice as knowledge that the statement
was false or with reckless disregard for the truth. 119 This actual malice standard is one of the
most stringent standards because it places a very high burden on the plaintiff when the defendant
was speaking about an issue of public concern.120 However, many other countries that do not
have this unabridged right to freedom of speech, like the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,121 have subscribed to the balancing test described
within this comment as a guide to analyzing the legality of defamation laws.
Criminal defamation is contrary to international human rights law as adjudicated in major
human rights institutions like the ECHR and the Inter-American Court. The ECHR has held that
this inquiry focuses on whether this state interference of free expression was proportionate to the
legitimate aim of protecting an individual’s reputation in Lingens v. Austria.122 The court
reaffirmed this holding in Castells v. Spain. In Lingens, a journalist alleged in a magazine article
that the head of the state socialist party had been involved in accommodating Nazis. The
journalist was subsequently convicted of criminal defamation.123 The defendant in Castells was
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a senator who alleged that the Spanish government had murdered many Basque separatists.

124

He was eventually found guilty of criminal defamation.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights recently addressed this issue. In July of
2004, the Inter-American Court reversed a criminal sentence against a journalist for a Costa
Rican paper, La Nación.125 The reporter, Mauricio Herrera Ulloa, cited European papers
alleging the corruption of a Costa Rican diplomat. A Costa Rican court convicted him of
criminal defamation.
A Paraguayan criminal defamation conviction of former presidential candidate Ricardo
Canese was also reversed by the Inter-American Court in August of that same year.126 Canese
made statements to the press questioning connections between his opponent and the country’s
former dictator. Canese was convicted of criminal defamation; he was sentenced to four months
in prison and fined US $7,500.127 The court reversed the conviction because it impermissibly
violated his rights under the American Convention of Human Rights.
Furthermore, there is a growing international trend toward denying the government legal
standing in civil defamation cases. The UN Committee on Human Rights stated called for the
abolition of standing for the government, finding it a deplorable offense.128 Recent examples
include decisions by the English House of Lords,129 the Indian Supreme Court,130 the Supreme
Court of South Africa,131 and the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe.132 These courts have articulated
three main rationales for the denial of standing to governmental bodies: (1) the importance of
vigorous public discourse and the chilling effect of defamation suits; (2) defamation laws are to
protect reputational interests and governments by their nature cannot have a reputation because a
government is not a person; and (3) it is an inappropriate use of taxpayer money to allow the
government to use that money to repress the taxpayers’ right to freedom of expression.133 This is
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a very creative solution as it satisfies several very important concerns: it allows civil defamation
suits as recourse to damage done to one’s reputation while protecting public debate, a primary
concern with freedom of expression issues and preventing governmental abuse of defamation
laws.
LEGAL PROBLEM
The United Nations Transitory Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) instituted a number of
laws that were designed to be transitory, much like the authority itself. Cambodia’s current laws
read like a patchwork quilt: some new laws have been passed by the legislature that should
overrule the UNTAC laws while other UNTAC laws remain good law today. The result is a
dizzying confusion for anyone trying to adhere to Cambodian law in any arena from land laws to
criminal procedure.
Criminal defamation laws like Article 63 dangerously inhibit public discourse. Penal
detention is not an appropriate remedy for damage to one’s reputation. Civil defamation laws
adequately ensure the state’s interest in protecting the reputational rights of its citizens. A
democracy’s survival is predicated upon this freedom of expression and the ability of individuals
to criticize their own government when they have legitimate reasons to do so. A criminal
defamation law is a dangerous weapon that can be improperly pointed by a government at its
opponents.

This abuse of the criminal defamation law hinders the road to democracy.

ANALYSIS
The Cambodian Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of expression. UNTAC
Article 63 improperly violates that right. In order to effectuate this right to freedom of
expression, the UNTAC law of criminal defamation must be abolished.
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The Cambodian Constitution has a separate provision mandating that all laws must be in
strict conformity with the constitution, further emphasizing the importance of the constitutional
kram (the Khmer word for laws promulgated by the Parliament). Article 63 was written before
the Cambodian Constitution was created. The UNTAC law, by criminalizing defamation, is
incompatible with the Cambodian Constitution’s guarantees of free expression. Article 31 of the
Cambodian Constitution requires that the rights of the individual to free speech be balanced with
the rights of others, as one cannot be accommodated by violating another. However, the criminal
punishment of one who defames another tips this scale, it impermissibly encumbers one’s
freedom of expression. There cannot be freedom of expression when a speaker can be jailed for
voicing his opinion. A balance must be found to ensure that Khmer citizens are free to comment
on the actions of the government without being taken to jail without bail as many recently have
been. A civil defamation law is the only way that a defamation law can respect the rights
guaranteed in Article 41 of the Cambodian Constitution.
Treaties
The Government of Cambodia acceded to the ICCPR on May 26, 1992.134 Cambodia
made no reservations to the treaty.135 As a result of Cambodia’s accession, Cambodia is bound
by the treaty and accordingly is required to perform its obligations in good faith.136 The ICCPR
guarantees the right to freedom of expression. The Cambodian government has the obligation to
respect that in addition to its own obligation to do so under its own Constitution. If Cambodia
does not fulfill that obligation, it will be in violation of the treaty.137
The first optional protocol provides a strong incentive for countries to abide by the
obligations agreed to in the treaty because it allows individuals to bring claims to the UNHRC
when they have exhausted all available domestic remedies. However states are only bound if
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they specifically sign the optional protocol. Cambodia signed the optional protocol on
September 27, 2004.138 By signing this protocol, Cambodian individuals may now bring claims
to the UNHRC alleging violations of the ICCPR by its government after they have exhausted all
domestic remedies or when the individual’s access to that remedy has been unreasonably
prolonged.139 The ability of this external body to be able to judge Cambodian laws and decisions
by its judiciary should provide strong encouragement for the government to ensure its laws are in
accord with the ICCPR.
Cambodia has an obligation to protect the freedom of expression of its citizens and may
only restrict that right in order to protect legitimate reputational interests. Though the
government argues to the contrary, protecting Cambodia’s political interests is not within this
scope. Criminal defamation laws are disproportionately punitive and accordingly violate the
ICCPR’s mandate that freedom of expression be protected. Defamation laws are only acceptable
where they are the least restrictive means necessary to protect the reputational interests of
individuals, not governments. A civil defamation law is the only way to achieve that balance.
Customary International Law
The international system has no central lawmaking body, as a result one must turn to
customary international law or general practice that is accepted as law. Customary international
law demonstrates the typical way states resolve a problem. There is no analogy to this in
domestic systems. Elements of customary international law include state practice and opinio
juris.140 Showing state practice requires demonstrating what states generally do, how states have
responded. Opinio juris is the obligation a state feels to behave in a certain way, that a state
believes a certain response would be the correct legal response.141 It usually arises from
consistent state practices in response to a certain issue.
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Customary international law in the human rights field is slightly different. The nature of
human rights violations mandates this difference. This is because states generally do not bring
claims against other states for internal human rights violations unless it affects their own
nationals.142 In looking for practice and opinio juris one must turn to the international forums
that deal with human rights concerns.143 It is in these forums that the issues are argued and
debated, it is here where the issues are resolved. By evaluating the position these forums have
taken, one can assess whether the right has become part of customary international law.144
Application of Customary International Law to Defamation Laws
Freedom of expression is a right recognized by the ICCPR, a treaty which binds 155
parties.145 Article 19 is now considered part of customary international law.146 In analyzing
defamation laws, a balancing test best incorporates the competing rights to freedom of
expression as well as the rights of an individual to protect his or her reputation.147 Widespread
inclusion in national law and a general recognition of its international significance is one
indication that a certain approach has become customary international law.148
The ECHR adopted the balancing test in Lingens. It continued to use this balancing test
in subsequent cases, such as Castells. In Lingens, the ECHR emphasized that greater deference
must be afforded to freedom of expression when the speech concerns political controversy.149
The court held that any interference with one’s freedom of expression by the state in the name of
protecting individual reputation must be proportionately necessary in a democratic society.150
Defamation laws must reflect a balance between the right to freedom of expression and the right
to reputation. The court stressed that freedom of expression “constitutes one of the essential
foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each
individual’s self-fulfillment.”151 A state cannot impose unduly harsh penalties as it violates

28

one’s right to freedom of expression.152 The ECHR, however, has been unwilling to reject all
criminal defamations, viewing it as an issue of state sovereignty. Nonetheless, using the
ECHR’s own test, criminal defamation laws will generally fail the Lingens test as unnecessary in
a democratic society where there is a high premium on public discourse.
The Inter-American Court has also found criminal defamation laws to impermissibly
restrict freedom of expression. In reaching its decision in Herrera Ulloa, the Inter-American
Court focused on the need for public debate rather than the protection of public officials.153 The
Court mandated that Costa Rica amend its domestic defamation laws to conform with the
American Convention on Human Rights’ guarantee of freedom of expression.154 The InterAmerican Court clearly embraced the importance of freedom of expression in its ruling on this
case of first impression.
In Canese, the Inter-American Court held that the defendant’s criminal defamation
conviction violated the rights embodied in Articles 13 (Right to Freedom of Thought and
Expression) and that the state of Paraguay failed to comply with the obligation established in
Article 1(1) (Obligation to Respect Rights).155 The Court additionally commented that
Paraguay’s criminal defamation law violated international law.156
In sum, these cases, augmented by scholarly work on the topic, demonstrate the
contemporary international view that criminal defamation laws are incompatible with a qualified
right of freedom of expression. Criminal defamation is too extreme of a punishment and upsets
the balance between this interest in freedom of expression and the state’s interest in protecting an
individual’s reputation.
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PROPOSAL
The Cambodian Parliament must pass a new defamation law that reflects the rights
enshrined in Cambodia’s Constitution. The criminal defamation law must be repealed. This new
law must be a civil defamation law in order to conform with Cambodia’s obligations under the
international treaties it has ratified and conforms to customary international law. In order to
protect Khmer citizens’ rights to freedom of expression, it is vital to strike a proper balance
between freedom of expression and to the right to protect one’s reputation by establishing a
recourse for those who have been unfairly defamed. Criminal defamation laws therefore have no
place in a democracy because they burden the right to freedom of expression too heavily.
Additionally, a civil defamation law must not allow the government to have standing to bring a
suit in order to prevent the abuse of civil defamation laws.157 This is especially important in
Cambodia where the judiciary is not independent and functions as an arm of the executive.
If Cambodia’s defamation laws do not change, individuals who have been convicted
under Article 63 can bring a claim to the UNHRC after exhausting all domestic remedies.
Following conviction at the trial court level, the defendant would need to pursue an appeal. If
the higher courts either refuse to take the case on appeal or there is an unreasonable delay in
issuing a decision, the defendant can then appeal his conviction to the UNHRC under the First
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.158 This is an extreme legal remedy because it requires one to go
beyond the Cambodian legal system and petition an international forum to accept the case.
The Constitutional Council interprets the constitutionality of laws. If the Council
somehow finds this law to be constitutional, while the author of this comment proposes it is
unconstitutional in light of the guarantees established in Article 41, an individual could bring a
claim to the UNHRC alleging that Article 63 violates Cambodia’s treaty obligations. The
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UNHRC would then have to accept the case and issue a decision on the legality of Article 63
under the ICCPR.
CONCLUSION
Criminal defamation laws have no place in a country that guarantees freedom of
expression. UNTAC Article 63 was designed to be a transitional law yet it remains part of
Cambodia’s current laws. It must be abolished, as Article 150 of the Cambodian Constitution
requires the abolition of any unconstitutional restriction on human rights. Cambodians like Kem
Sokha have felt its effects as has Cambodian society in a country where freedom of speech is
already so repressed that people only discuss politics with their families and closest friends in the
privacy of one’s home. The purpose of this comment is to draw attention to the gap between
Cambodia’s Constitution, its treaty obligations under the ICCPR, customary international law,
and UNTAC Article 63. A new constitutional law must be passed and that law must be a civil
defamation law given Article 41’s guarantee of freedom of expression. Furthermore, to
safeguard against potential abuses of the civil law and encourage public discourse, the law must
deny standing to the government in defamation suits.
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